INTRODUCTION
The Elections Clause of the U.S. Constitution is the Swiss army knife of federal election law. Ensconced in Article I, it provides, "The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations."
1 Its Article II analogue, the Presidential Electors Clause, similarly specifies that "[e]ach State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors" to select the President. 2 The concise language of these clauses performs a surprisingly wide range of functions implicating numerous doctrines and fields beyond voting rights, including statutory interpretation, 3 state separation of powers and other issues of state constitutional law, 4 federal court deference to state-court rulings, 5 administrative discretion, 6 and preemption.
elections through any process that the state constitution includes within the state's "legislative power," even if the state legislature itself is not involved.
13
The Supreme Court explored the issue in greater depth in Smiley v. Holm, in which it permitted a state governor to veto a federal redistricting bill passed by the state legislature, because the state constitution included vetoes as part of the legislative process.
14 It explained that a legislature's exercise of its power under the Elections Clause to enact laws governing congressional elections "must be in accordance with the method which the State has prescribed for legislative enactments." 15 The Court added, "We find no suggestion in the [Elections Clause] of an attempt to endow the legislature of the State with power to enact laws in any manner other than that in which the constitution of the State has provided that laws shall be enacted." 16 The scope of the Elections Clause is again before the Supreme Court in Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission. 17 Arizona voters passed a state constitutional amendment through the initiative process to "remove[] congressional redistricting authority from the Legislature and vest[] that authority in a new entity, the Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission ("IRC")."
18 A three-judge panel of the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona upheld the IRC's constitutionality because "Hildebrant and Smiley . . . demonstrate that the word 'Legislature' in the Elections Clause refers to the legislative process used in [a] state, determined by that state's own constitution and laws," 19 rather than the institutional legislature itself. The Elections Clause therefore "does not prohibit a state from vesting the power to conduct congressional districting" in an entity other than the state legislature, such as Arizona's redistricting commission. 20 Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission is poised to be the Supreme Court's first holding about whether a state's institutional legislative body may be wholly stripped of its powers concerning federal redistricting, if not federal elections altogether. 21 The immediate effects of 13 Id. at 568-69. 14 285 U.S. 355, 368 (1932) . 15 Id. at 367. 16 Id. at 367-68. 17 18 Id. at 1048. 19 Id. at 1054. 20 Id. at 1056. 21 The Court already has stated in dicta that a state may permit entities other than the legislature itself to redraw congressional districts. Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1, 27 (1975) (" [R] eapportionment is primarily the duty and responsibility of the State through its legislature or other body, rather than of a its ruling will reverberate far beyond Arizona, as "12 states . . . give first and final authority for legislative redistricting to a group other than the legislature." 22 More broadly, this case will revisit the meaning of the term legislature as used in the Elections Clause (and, by extension, Article II's Presidential Electors Clause), confirming whether it actually refers to: the legislature alone; the legislature plus whatever other processes or entities a State constitution includes within the lawmaking process; or any process or entity that a state constitution vests with legislative power over federal elections, to the potential exclusion of the institutional legislature.
This Article contends that the term legislature should be interpreted in accordance with its plain meaning, as referring solely and exclusively to the multimember body of representatives within each state generally responsible for enacting its laws. 23 This conclusion becomes especially clear through an intratextual approach to the Elections Clause.
Part I of this Article introduces the intratextual method of constitutional interpretation, explaining how the Constitution's repeated uses of a term often provide a wealth of context from which a court may discern the term's meaning. Part II offers an intratextual interpretation of the Elections Clause, examining how each of the other contexts in which the Constitution uses the term legislature demonstrates that the term refers to a specific institution. In fact, the Supreme Court itself employed an intratextual analysis in Hawke v. Smith to conclude that Article V permits a state to ratify a constitutional amendment only through a vote of its institutional legislature (or a specially called convention), not a public referendum. 24 Part III shows that this understanding is confirmed by both a traditional textualist approach to the term, as well as the "independent state legislature" 26 This approach urges a reader interpreting "a contested word or phrase that appears in the Constitution" to consider its meaning as it appears in other passages.
27 "[T]extually nonadjoining clauses" of the Constitution should be placed "side by side for careful analysis," to ensure that a proposed interpretation of a term makes sense in the various contexts in which the Constitution deploys it.
28
Akhil Amar identifies three main types of intratextual arguments. First, when attempting to determine the meaning of a word in a particular clause, other constitutional provisions can "serve[] a basic dictionary function" by "illustrat [ing] [its] usage." 29 Second, a reader also may arrive at the "best" interpretation of a term by determining the meaning that would fit best with its usage throughout the Constitution. 30 Finally, when entire clauses are structured identically to each other, with only one or two key words changed, they generally should be read in pari materia and interpreted consistently.
Amar contends that the "greatest virtue of intratextualism" is that "it takes seriously the document as a whole rather than as a jumbled grab bag of assorted clauses." 32 Thus, intratextualism should be used to "suggest possible readings" or "generate interpretative leads and clues" that must be assessed through "other tools of interpretation," not to "dictate results." 41 Adrian Vermeule and Ernest A. Young offer a powerful critique of intratextualism, questioning its premise that the Constitution should be given a consistent, uniform interpretation. They point out that the document may lack internal consistency because its "component provisions were enacted at different times, in different circumstances, and for different reasons." 42 Even the text of the original, unamended Constitution is the result of numerous "tradeoffs, political battles won and lost, and compromised ideals." 43 Rather than an integrated document springing from a single author, it is the product of a body of people disagreeing, the phrase "right of the people" as used in the Second Amendment to protect an individual right to bear arms, because the Constitution's three other uses of that phrase "unambiguously refer to individual rights. compromising, and amending each other's work. It is highly unlikely that the dozens of men who contributed to its writing all used important terms consistently. 44 Moreover, because intratextualism requires judges to interpret a term as it appears in numerous constitutional provisions, this approach may unduly tax their "time, information, and expertise;" lead to more errors; and allow for more subjectivity than a clause-bound method of interpretation.
45
Intratextualism also is more indeterminate and manipulable than clausebound textualism, because it does not offer interpretive guidance when a term's apparent meaning based on a single clause in isolation differs from its apparent meaning based on other clauses in which it appears. Thus, a reader still must choose among competing interpretations using a theory or process other than intratextualism itself. 46 William Treanor, further critiquing intratextualism from an originalist perspective, adds that it is "unreliable" because it "privileges a small subset of contemporaneous usages (those in the constitutional document) over the larger body of relevant contemporaneous usages." 47 At a minimum, intratextualism provides a useful data point for courts to consider in determining the meaning of a disputed term, and would be especially useful for the Supreme Court in interpreting the meaning of legislature in the Elections Clause and Presidential Electors Clause. The term is concrete and reasonably susceptible of a limited number of definitions. Moreover, it does not appear to lend itself to the type of compromise or mutually inconsistent understandings to which other, more general language might be subject.
Additionally, the original, unamended Constitution uses legislature on numerous different occasions, thereby avoiding the issue of whether subsequent constitutional amendments employ it in the same manner. As Part II demonstrates, the numerous other constitutional clauses that use the term all refer to a state's sole lawmaking body comprised of elected representatives, rather than some broader conception of the word. This consistent pattern of usage creates a strong presumption that the Elections Clause and Presidential Electors Clause employ it in the same fashion. And, 44 See Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 610 (1842) (pointing out that, because many constitutional provisions "were matters of compromise of opposing interests and opinions . . . no uniform rule of interpretation can be applied to it") [http://perma.cc/JMF4-DN67]. 45 as discussed in Part III, the results of this intratextual analysis can be corroborated through both a plain meaning interpretation as well as consideration of the longstanding independent state legislature doctrine. Even if the constraints under which many judges operate may prevent them from using intratextualism effectively, the Supreme Court can devote sufficient time and attention to a case of this magnitude to make intratextualism an appropriate and useful strategy.
II. INTRATEXTUALISM AND THE ELECTIONS CLAUSE
The Constitution contains numerous references to state legislatures that may be used to elucidate that term's meaning as it appears in the Elections Clause (and, by extension, the Presidential Electors Clause). These references may be divided into four groups: (i) those that discuss features of a legislature; (ii) those that distinguish between a state legislature and other state personnel or entities; (iii) those that confer quasi-legislative or nonlegislative powers upon a legislature; and (iv) those, such as the Elections Clause and Presidential Electors Clause, that confer legislative authority over certain subjects upon the legislature.
The text, context, original understanding, and consistent history of interpretation of the first three types of references to the term legislature demonstrate that it is best understood as referring to a state's general lawmaking body of elected representatives, rather than a broader legislative power 48 or other entities upon which a state's constitution may attempt to confer a portion of that legislative power. These provisions create a strong, and ultimately insurmountable, presumption that the same meaning should be attributed to the term as it appears in the fourth category of clauses: those such as the Elections Clause and Presidential Electors Clause that grant state legislatures the power to enact certain types of laws. Thus, every clause that gives some insight into the nature of the legislature uses the term to refer to a particular institution within each state that contains members, is presumptively comprised of multiple branches, periodically convenes and meets for limited periods of time, and then enters into recess.
A. Discussions of Legislatures

B. Provisions That Distinguish Between Legislatures and Other State
Personnel and Entities Several other constitutional provisions expressly distinguish between legislatures (and their members) and other state officials and entities. For example, as discussed above, the Oath Clause requires "Members of the several State Legislatures, and all executive and judicial Officers . . . of the several States" to take an oath or affirmation to support the Constitution. Even more telling is Article V, which specifies that a proposed constitutional amendment may be ratified either by "the Legislatures" or "Conventions" in three-fourths of the States, depending on the mode of ratification authorized by Congress. 56 This clause demonstrates that, when the Framers wished to authorize action by the people independent of their institutional legislatures, they knew how to do so. Article V further bolsters the conclusion that the term legislature refers exclusively to the particular institution within a state that exercises its general lawmaking authority.
C. References to Quasi-Legislative or Nonlegislative Powers
Numerous constitutional provisions confer authority on state legislatures other than the power to enact certain types of laws. The Constitution grants them the power to choose U.S. For most, if not all, of these provisions, the Framers' debates over the Constitution further confirm that they exclusively empower institutional legislatures to perform the specified acts. For example, as originally enacted, the Constitution directed state legislatures, rather than the electorate, to choose U.S. senators. 64 During the Constitutional Convention, James Dickenson moved that senators be elected by state legislature for two reasons:
1. because the sense of the States would be better collected through their Governments; than immediately from the people at large. 2. because he wished the Senate to consist of the most distinguished characters . . . and he thought such characters more likely to be selected by the State Legislatures, than in any other mode. 65 He later added that granting legislatures this power would help preserve the states as distinct entities and "produce that collision" between the federal and state governments "which should be wished for in order to check each other." 66 Throughout the ensuing debate, all delegates used the term legislature consistently, referring to a particular, well-understood entity within each state. 67 Later in the convention, James Wilson reiterated:
[O]ne branch of the Genl. Thus, in commenting on the selection of senators, Wilson expressly distinguished among a "State" as a whole, state legislatures, and "the people at large." 69 Likewise, in discussing the Senate Vacancies Clause, the Framers' debates unmistakably concerned institutional legislatures: they discussed the relative frequency with which various states' legislatures met and the power of certain legislatures to select the state's governor. 70 The same is true of Article V's delegation of authority to state legislatures to call for a new constitutional convention and to ratify amendments to the Constitution. 71 As the Supreme Court recognized in Hawke v. Smith, legislature was "not a term of uncertain meaning when incorporated into the Constitution. What it meant when adopted it still means for the purpose of interpretation. A legislature was then the representative body which made the laws of the people."
72 The debates at the Constitutional Convention likewise confirm that the power to request federal assistance under the Domestic Violence Clause lies specifically in the institutional legislature.
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D.
References to Legislative Authority The plain text of the Constitution, context of other constitutional provisions, and Framers' original understanding all confirm that the Constitution's numerous other instances of the term legislature uniformly refer to the specific institution within each state that is comprised of elected representatives and exercises general lawmaking authority. Compelling evidence is therefore necessary to conclude that the term has a different, unique, and unusual meaning as used in the Elections Clause and Presidential Electors Clause. The Supreme Court previously held that the term legislature should be accorded a different meaning in the Elections Clause (and, by extension, the Presidential Electors Clause) because those provisions-unlike the Constitution's other references to legislatures-confer a type of traditionally legislative authority on state legislatures: the ability to enact laws regulating federal elections. 74 The Court never explained, however, why this somewhat different context requires a unique definition of legislature that differs from its use throughout the rest of the Constitution.
In Ohio ex rel. Davis v. Hildebrant, the Court held that the Elections Clause permitted Congress to enact a law authorizing states to draw or alter congressional districts through either state legislation or public referenda. 75 It rejected as "plainly without substance" a challenge to a state referendum that nullified a redistricting plan enacted by the Ohio legislature. 76 Despite the Court's single passing reference to the Elections Clause, however, it assumed that any constitutional challenge to the use of public referenda to regulate federal elections must arise under the Guarantee Clause.
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According to the Court, the Petitioners were arguing that public referenda "introduce a virus" that "annihilates representative government and causes a State . . . to be not republican in form." 78 It summarily rejected that argument on the grounds that Guarantee Clause claims are nonjusticiable. 79 Thus, while Hildebrant mentioned the Elections Clause, it neither held nor purported to explain why the electorate or a public referendum qualifies as a legislature under the Elections Clause. Rather, the Hildebrant Court failed to recognize that a distinct Elections Clause claim existed, and instead transmuted the plaintiff's claim under that provision into a nonjusticiable Guarantee Clause argument.
In gives authority to the State to legislate" concerning federal elections through public referenda.
81
Congress therefore could recognize a "referendum as part of the legislative authority of the State" under constitutional provisions dealing with the enactment of laws.
82 "Such legislative action," the Court reasoned, "is entirely different from the requirement of the Constitution as to the expression of assent or dissent to a proposed amendment to the Constitution. In such expression no legislative action is authorized or required." 83 Hawke's premise-that Hildebrant purported to interpret the Elections Clause-is an overstatement. As discussed above, Hildebrant misinterpreted or avoided the Elections Clause issue by transmuting it into a Guarantee Clause claim. 84 In any event, Hawke never explained why the term legislature should be given different meanings under the Elections Clause and Article V (or the other constitutional provisions it surveyed). The Court pointed out that enacting statutes under the Elections Clause to regulate federal elections is a traditional legislative activity, while ratifying constitutional amendments under Article V is a quasi-or nonlegislative act. 85 It never explains, however, why this distinction requires or justifies attributing a different and unusual meaning to the term legislature. In light of the Constitution's consistent use of that term throughout the rest of the document, there is a strong presumption that the Elections Clause and Presidential Electors Clause use it in the same manner-a presumption that neither Hildebrant nor Hawke overcomes.
The Court gestured toward these issues in Smiley v. Holm, in which it considered whether the Elections Clause permits a state's governor to veto a state law regulating federal elections that the state's institutional legislature enacted.
86 Smiley reiterated that, unlike most other constitutional provisions referring to legislatures, the Elections Clause grants them lawmaking authority. 87 The Court held, "As the authority is conferred for the purpose of making laws for the State, it follows, in the absence of an indication of a contrary intent, that the exercise of the authority must be in accordance with the method which the State has prescribed for legislative enactments." 88 Smiley never held that the term legislature should mean something other than a state's institutional, representative lawmaking body. Rather, it concluded only that when such an entity exercises authority under the 81 Id. at 231 (emphasis added). 82 Id. at 230. 83 Id. at 231. 84 See supra notes 76-79 and accompanying text. 85 Hawke, 253 U.S. at 231. 86 285 U.S. 355, 365-66 (1932). 87 Id. at 367. 88 Id.
Elections Clause, it must do so subject to the standard lawmaking process set forth in the state constitution, including a gubernatorial veto. 89 Thus, the holdings of both Hawke and Smiley are consistent with an intratextual reading of the term legislature as used in the Elections Clause and Presidential Electors Clause, and Hildebrant does not actually address the issue. The Supreme Court never identified any evidence that the Framers intended to use the term differently in those provisions than throughout the rest of the Constitution. Nor did it provide a persuasive explanation as to why the word should mean something different when referring to the exercise of a traditionally legislative power rather than a quasi-or nonlegislative power.
The Federalist Papers confirm that the term legislature bears the same meaning in the Elections Clause as it does in Article I, § 3, which permitted state legislatures to select U.S. senators. Federalist No. 59 explains that state legislatures seeking to undermine the national government are more likely to do so by abusing their power under the Elections Clause by refusing to hold House elections, than by refusing to appoint Senators. 90 The Elections Clause itself alleviates this risk by permitting Congress to impose its own rules for congressional elections if states fail to act. 91 The early Commentaries of both St. George Tucker 92 and Chancellor Kent 93 likewise discuss legislatures under Article I, § 3 and under the Elections Clauseoften in the same sentence-without suggesting any potential differences in the term's meaning. Kent also distinguished between having the legislature select presidential electors and allowing the "people at large" to do so, confirming that a power vested in a "legislature" may not be exercised directly by the electorate as a whole. 94 Thus, the best reading of the word legislature as it appears throughout the Constitution, including in the Elections Clause and Presidential Electors Clause, is that it refers solely and exclusively to a state's general lawmaking body comprised of elected representatives and cannot extend to other entities such as independent redistricting commissions. 95 Here, an intratextual interpretation of the term legislature is confirmed by the original understanding of that term in the Founding Era, as well as the independent state legislature doctrine that courts applied for well over a century and a half following the Constitution's enactment.
A. Original Understanding
An intratextual interpretation of the term legislature is consistent with a clause-bound approach that focuses on how that term was generally understood in the Founding Era. Any such textual analysis must begin with dictionaries from that period. 96 Entities such as the Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission would not qualify as legislatures under the prevailing definition from the Founding Era for at least three reasons. First, those definitions' use of the definite article "the" implies the existence of a single legislature within each sovereign entity. They appear to preclude recognition of multiple entities within a state as legislatures. Second, the definitions refer to the exercise of a general lawmaking power. An entity specifically empowered only to enact certain kinds of laws or perform certain narrow functions (i.e., drawing congressional districts) would not qualify as a legislature. Third, drawing congressional districts arguably does not even qualify as "mak[ing] laws." Perhaps more importantly, every state constitution from the Founding Era that used the term legislature defined it as a distinct multimember entity comprised of representatives with the authority to enact laws, 101 and most other references to legislatures throughout those documents are consistent with that understanding. 102 If the Elections Clause and Presidential Electors Clause used the term legislature in a broader capacity, they would apparently be the only provisions in any organic documents from the Founding Era to do so-not a single precedent in any state constitution supports a more expansive interpretation.
The Federalist Papers and Justice Story's Commentaries on the Constitution reinforce this interpretation. Federalist No. 59 and Section 814 of Story's Commentaries, which focus specifically on the Elections Clause, contend that there "were only three ways" in which the power to regulate federal elections could have been allotted: "it must either have been lodged wholly in the national legislature, or wholly in the State legislatures, or primarily in the latter and ultimately in the former."
103 They explain that the Elections Clause embodies the final alternative. 104 These passages' contrast of the "national legislature," which refers exclusively to Congress, with "state legislatures" strongly suggests that the latter refers to a state's analogue to Congress: its institutional legislature, comprised of elected representatives, that exercises general lawmaking authority.
William Rawle's A View of the Constitution likewise states that the Elections Clause permits Congress to "make or alter" regulations governing federal elections, "except as to the place of choosing senators," in order to "guard against a refractory disposition, should it ever arise in the legislatures of the states," concerning the issue. 105 He explains that the Elections Clause's exception concerning the place of choosing senators "was proper, as congress ought not to have the power of convening the state legislature at any other than its usual place of meeting." 106 Thus, Rawle also treated the entity empowered to select senators as the same one delegated sole constitutional authority to regulate federal elections (subject only to congressional override).
B. The Independent State Legislature Doctrine
Finally, the independent state legislature doctrine, which has been embraced by the Supreme Court, state courts, and both houses of Congress, 107 further confirms the accuracy of an intratextual interpretation of legislature. This doctrine recognizes that a state legislature's authority to regulate federal elections comes directly from the U.S. Constitution. 108 Consequently, a state constitution may neither impose substantive limits on the scope of a legislature's authority to regulate the time, place, or manner of federal elections, nor strip the legislature of its prerogative to do so. Arizona's Independent Redistricting Commission flatly violates the independent state legislature doctrine because the state constitutional amendment that created it purports to strip the legislature, as a matter of state constitutional law, of authority it derives directly from the U.S. Constitution. 114 The court enforced a state law providing that a candidate had to receive only a plurality of votes in order to win a federal election, despite a state constitutional provision specifying that all candidates had to receive an absolute majority to prevail. 115 Likewise, the Nebraska Supreme Court held that it was "unnecessary . . . to consider whether or not there is a conflict between the method of appointment of presidential electors directed by the Legislature" and a particular provision of the state constitution. 116 It explained that a state constitution may not "'circumscribe the legislative power' granted by the Constitution of the United States" to regulate the selection of presidential electors. 117 Other courts have reached the same conclusion.
The U.S. House of Representatives adopted the independent state legislature doctrine in resolving an election challenge in Baldwin v. Trowbridge. 119 The House upheld the validity of votes cast in a congressional election pursuant to a state law that authorized voting by military members who were absent from their districts on Election Day, despite a state constitutional provision requiring that all votes be cast in person. 120 Similarly, in a report on the Electoral College, the U.S. Senate Committee on Privileges and Elections concluded that a state legislature's power under the Presidential Electors Clause to regulate presidential elections cannot be:
[T]aken from [state legislatures] or modified by their State constitutions any more than can their power to elect Senators of the United States. Whatever provisions may be made by statute, or by the State constitution, to choose electors by the people, there is no doubt of the right of the legislature to resume the power at any time, for it can neither be taken away nor abdicated.
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Numerous commentators have embraced the independent state legislatures doctrine, 122 while others have rejected it. 123 Its longstanding history and acceptance by state and federal courts, as well as both houses of Congress, however, confirms the validity of an intratextual interpretation of the Elections Clause and Presidential Electors Clause. The legislature, as referenced in those provisions, is the state's general lawmaking body, and its power under the federal Constitution to regulate federal elections may not be reduced or withdrawn by state constitutions.
IV. CONCLUSION Because of the Constitution's numerous references to state legislatures, an intratextual approach sheds compelling light on the term's proper meaning in the Elections Clause and Presidential Electors Clause. The text, context, drafting history, contemporaneous interpretations, and history of subsequent judicial interpretation of the numerous other constitutional provisions referring to legislatures collectively confirm that the term refers exclusively to the elected body of representatives within each state that exercises general lawmaking authority. Neither the Supreme Court nor academic commentators have provided a persuasive reason for concluding that, despite the consistent use of the term throughout most of the Constitution, it should be given a different and unusual construction solely for purposes of the Elections Clause and Presidential Electors Clause.
In particular, there is no basis for concluding that the word legislature as used in the Elections Clause and Presidential Electors Clause refers broadly to a state's "lawmaking authority," allowing a state's voters to directly regulate federal elections through public initiatives or referenda. Likewise, because the Constitution specifically empowers the state legislature to regulate the "Time, Place and Manner" of federal elections, attempts to allow outside entities such as the Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission to determine the boundaries of congressional districts violate the U.S. Constitution. 
